Preface: 'The 2013-2016 West African Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control' by Piot, P et al.
PREFACE to “The 2013-16 Ebola epidemic: Data, decision-making and disease 
control” 
 
Peter Piot, Cordelia Coltart, Katherine E Atkins 
 
 
Ebola’s history 
 
Until 2013, there had been 24 naturally occurring reported outbreaks of Ebolavirus 
affecting humans. All but one of these outbreaks were confined to four central African 
countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), South Sudan 
(formerly Sudan), Gabon and Uganda. In total, approximately 2300 people had been 
known to have contracted the infection, around 1500 of whom had died. The only 
reported human infection in West Africa was a single case of Taï Forest Ebolavirus 
infection in Côte d’Ivoire in 1994.  
 
Ebola was first discovered following an outbreak near the Ebola River in Zaire in 1976. 
Analysis from this first reported outbreak identified two key modes of transmission: i) 
healthcare workers and family members were becoming infected after close contact with 
a patient, and ii) patient-to-patient transmission was occurring through reuse of 
contaminated needles for injections at the local hospital. This outbreak was rapidly 
controlled as quarantine measures were instigated by village-leaders, and nosocomial 
transmission was eliminated when the hospital was forced to close after most healthcare 
workers were infected. The absence of sustained transmission and the small number of 
individuals infected did not pose a wider public health threat outside the affected 
communities. Ebola, therefore, did not hit the headlines. It did, however, generate some 
scientific interest in vaccine development and pathogenesis, triggered mainly by 
biosecurity concerns given its high case fatality risk. 
 
Awareness of Ebola 
 
Prior to 2013, public knowledge around Ebola was limited to the descriptions in graphic 
novels and Hollywood blockbusters, largely inspired by the 1995 Ebola outbreak in 
Kikwit, DRC. These productions generally depicted a catastrophic, worst case scenario, 
highlighting the potential apocalyptic qualities of Ebola—not only could it spread like 
wildfire, destroying communities, regions and continents, but it also held significant 
potential as a bioterrorism weapon. However, outside of Africa, indeed outside of central 
Africa, Ebola was considered more of fascination than a concern. It was a tropical disease, 
limited to central Africa and the most rural and poorest regions. That was soon to change.  
 
Ebola 2013–2016 
 
In December 2013, in Gueckedou prefecture in the Forestière region of Guinea, near the 
tripoint of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, a 2-year old boy would later be identified as 
the index case of this outbreak. During the following 28 months, there was sustained 
transmission across Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as spillover cases and 
connected outbreaks in a further three West African countries, three European countries 
and the US. There was a sense of shock, not least because none of these ten affected 
countries had previously experienced an Ebola case (except for one laboratory worker 
accidentally infected in the UK in the 1970s). This outbreak heralded a new era for 
Ebola—a multi-country epidemic of global significance. It was the result of a perfect 
storm of a slow response, the legacy of civil war and corrupt dictatorships, poorly 
functional health and governmental systems commanding little public trust, and highly 
mobile populations.  In its wake, the epidemic has left us with a list, albeit incomplete, of 
what went wrong in our attempts to control the disaster, and of what the lessons are for 
future outbreaks of Ebola and other highly lethal pathogens. 
 
What have we learned? 
 
After it became clear that much of the devastation could have been prevented, four 
different panels were formed to review the international response—the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, the Harvard University and the 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the Global Response 
to Ebola, the US National Academy of Medicine’s Commission on a Global Health Risk 
Framework for the Future, and the United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global 
Response to Health Crises. These panels aimed to identify the reasons that contributed to 
poor outbreak control, and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen future 
response. They were unanimous in implicating the WHO’s failings to avert the disaster. 
The WHO has since responded by restructuring its epidemic response capacity. This 
restructuring can, in principle, tackle several recommendations by the Harvard/LSHTM 
Panel which state the need for the WHO to scale back its broad remit and instead refocus 
on: providing technical assistance to nations to strengthen their public health system 
capacity and epidemic preparedness and response; providing emergency response and 
declarations; establishing best-practice guidance; and convening the global community. 
Other organisations have reacted to other Panel recommendations; most notably, the 
World Bank has launched a pandemic financing facility to underpin national response 
initiatives, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) has been 
launched to incentivise vaccine development for pathogens where there is market failure.  
A priority for CEPI is to complete full testing and registration of at least two Ebola 
vaccines so that they can be used in future Ebolavirus outbreaks and to protect health 
care workers and other vulnerable populations. Despite some improvement in global 
epidemic preparedness, implementation of most recommendations is still patchy and will 
require continued strong leadership—at political, scientific and public health levels.  
 
Many of the recommendations centred around global governance and leadership, with 
little attention to the role of the individual nations. However, for infectious disease 
outbreaks, acting effectively is often synonymous with acting rapidly.  Without 
strengthening local core capacity to rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks, weeks will 
be lost prior to international mobilization of resources occurring.  With an exponentially 
increasing number of cases, a delay of weeks can be the difference between effective 
outbreak control and a public health emergency. 
 
Was the response different to that during previous epidemics?  
 
This outbreak was unlike all previous outbreaks in many respects: it was unique in terms 
of its magnitude—being over 90 times larger than any previous outbreak; in terms of its 
timespan—with transmission continuing over two years; in terms of its geography—
occurring in West Africa where no human-to-human Ebola transmission had been 
reported; and in terms of its spatial distribution—with intense transmission spanning 
three entire countries, and significant urban spread. This is in contrast to previous 
outbreaks that were localised to specific rural areas or small towns that were 
geographically isolated. In previous outbreaks control effects (led by Médecins sans 
frontiers (MSF), The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and WHO alongside national 
authorities) were implemented prior to early cases seeding transmission in new areas. 
This was again displayed by the rapid control of an Ebola outbreak in Boende, DRC in 
2014, led mostly by Congolese experts, authorities, and MSF.   
 
In comparison to historical outbreaks, this West African outbreak at times seemed “out 
of control” and evolved into a major humanitarian crisis, resulting in an unprecedented 
global health response. It is the first time key players in an Ebola response have included 
international military and governmental organisations from the UK, USA, China, France, 
Cuba and the African Union, along with many other countries.  Public health strategies 
were complemented by military and military-style coordination and logistics that helped 
implement preventative interventions and enforced curfews to try to limit further 
transmission. 
 
Media coverage significantly affects how a disease is perceived. The 1995 Kikwit 
outbreak was the first epidemic to generate global media coverage, largely due to 
technological advancements making it possible to broadcast and send images in real time. 
This media attention played a major role in mobilizing public engagement. This attention 
led to increased resources during the epidemic and generated the development of several 
documentaries, books and films, producing a new global wave of public information 
about Ebola. Worldwide media attention exploded during this recent epidemic, and 
oscillated between helpful public information to almost hysterical fear-mongering.  
 
Ebola as a game-changer 
 
The unprecedented size and duration of the West African Ebola epidemic tested the limits 
of medical knowledge, health system infrastructure and capacity, and the international 
global health response. The epidemic uncovered fatal weaknesses in these systems that 
set back Ebola response, and if left unchanged, will hamper future disease control across 
all emergent diseases. With Western, Middle and Central Africa increasingly hosting 
dangerous ecological risk factors for zoonotic spillover events, this recent Ebola epidemic 
must be a game-changer for how we, as a global community, deal with this ever-present 
health threat. Great leaps forward have sometimes followed great tragedy, as was the 
case with the ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic. Achieving a political and social movement, 
AIDS activism allowed health to be placed on the top of global agendas. New health 
priorities allowed access to pharmaceuticals under patent to low income countries, and 
the field of “global health” emerged with its own research agenda.  
 
This Ebola epidemic highlighted the inadequacy of scientific and medical advancements 
in preventing global spread of emerging infections. Making progress will rely on higher-
level governance to improve economic incentives in pharmaceutical development and 
timely financial decisions. In addition, there is a great need for innovation—from 
diagnostics to vaccines, better data collection and management, improved detection and 
surveillance protocols, and sober consideration of the socio-economic drivers for many 
ecological risk factors for disease spillover.  
 
 
 
 
 
